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What Is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom 
of Information Act's Threshold Requirement 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' enacted in 1966, 
requires all governmental agencies to make their records avail- 
able to any person who submits a request which reasonably iden- 
tifies the records sought.' This general rule of disclosure has only 
a few narrow  exception^.^ Since the FOIA only purports to make 
information available if contained in a record, the meaning of 
that term is basic to the operation of the Act; however, a defini- 
tion of the term "record" is conspicuously lacking.' In the absence 
of legislative guidance, litigants have sought to stretch or shrink 
the meaning of the word in an attempt either to compel disclosure 
or to justify withholding information within agency contr01.~ 
These attempts to mold the definition of the term "record" 
have received inconsistent treatment by the courts. Since the 
interpretation of this key word can have a significant impact 
upon the scope and effectiveness of the FOIA, it is imperative 
that a reasoned and consistent viewpoint be maintained.' This 
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The statute was originally enacted as the Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) and was codified by Pub. L. No. 90- 
23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) a t  5 U.S.C. $ 552. The FOIA was amended in the 1974 Amendments 
to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), and again 
in the Government in the Sunshine Act $4, Pub. L. No. 94-409,90 Stat. 1241,1247 (1976). 
For background on the history, purposes, and operation of the Act, see generally 
Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act: An 
Article in Honor of Fred Rodell, 84 YALE L.J. 741 (1975); Davis, The Information Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U .  CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); Nader, Freedom from Information: 
The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.4.L.L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Freedom of 
Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974) [hereinafter 
ctied as FOIA Assessment]; Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the 
Regulations, 56 GEO. L.J. 18 (1967). 
2. 5 U.S.C. $ 552(a)(3) (1976). 
3. Id. § 552(b) (1976). For the text of these exemptions, see note 8 infra. 
4. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. $ 4  500-559 (1976), of which 
the FOIA is part, is similarly devoid of any clarification of the meaning of "record" for 
FOIA purposes. Section 552a of the APA does define the term with respect to privacy of 
information compiled about individuals, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1976), but that definition 
is not pertinent to a general disclosure provision. See note 59 infra. 
5. E.g., SDC Dev. Corp. v. Matthews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976); Save the Dol- 
phins v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Nixon v. 
Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,131,145 (D.D.C.), stayed sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 
427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per curiam, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
dismissed as moot, 437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977); Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 
130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
966 (1972). 
6. It has been asserted that most intellectual effort spent defining the term "record" 
408 
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Comment will explore the operation and background of the FOIA, 
compare different analytical approaches to interpreting the term 
"record," and suggest a conceptual model for dealing with the 
"record question." 
A. The FOIA: A Balance of Conflicting Interests 
In its attempt to open governmental processes to public scru- 
tiny via freedom of information legislation, Congress undertook 
the delicate task of striking a proper balance between the public's 
interest in knowing what government is doing and the govern- 
ment's interest in preserving the confidentiality or secrecy of cer- 
tain types of information. The Senate report noted: 
I t  is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but 
it is not an impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude 
that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, 
either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies 
in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, 
and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest 
responsible disclosure .' 
The balance the FOIA strikes between these interests re- 
quires agencies to disclose all information unless it falls into one 
of nine exemptions stated in the Act? Specifically, a large class 
in connection with the FOIA has been unnecessary. Sherwood, The Freedom of Informa- 
tion Act: A Compendium for the Military Lawyer, 52 MIL. L. REV. 103, 109 (1971). Since 
disputes continue to center on the meaning of the term, however, i t  can be argued that 
such efforts, rather than having been wasted, were merely unsuccessful. In that light, an 
attempt to provide a coherent and reasoned approach to treating the term is especially 
appropriate. 
7. S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (emphasis added). See also EPA v. 
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). 
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). The text of these exemptions is as follows: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are- 
(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and 
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an 
agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, 
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types 
of matters to be withheld; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or ~ o ~ d e n t i a l ;  
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not 
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; 
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
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of government-held information-agency records-is included 
within the scope of the Act? Within that class of information, 
certain types of records-final opinions, policy statements, or- 
ders, administrative staff manuals, and generally applicable sub- 
stantive and procedural rules-are singled out for special disclo- 
sure.1° Other types of records, such as investigatory files and clas- 
sified documents, are recognized as posing special problems, and 
much of that information is exempted from disclosure by the 
statute.I1 Finally, a general policy of disclosure of all other records 
is established.12 
To ensure that a proper balance was maintained between 
disclosure and confidentiality, Congress incorporated two en- 
forcement provisions into the FOIA. The first of these provisions 
is embodied in subsection (c) of the Act, which states in pertinent 
part: "This section does not authorize withholding of information 
. . . except as specifically stated in this section."13 Courts and 
commentators have noted that the emphasis of subsection (c) is 
to narrow the scope of the exemptions and to make them exclu- 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only 
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with en- 
forcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri- 
vacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a 
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a 
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security 
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confi- 
dential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) en- 
danger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel; 
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports 
prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervison of financial institutions; or 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con- 
cerning wells. 
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this 
subsection. 
Id. 
9. Only one subsection of the Act singles out agency records for disclosure, however. 
The other disclosure subsections refer to information which is in record form, such as final 
opinions, orders, and staff manuals. Compare 5 U.S.C. 8 552(a) (3) (1976) with 5 U.S.C. 4 
552(a)(1)-(2) (1976). 
10. Subsection (a)(l) of the Act lists the records which must be published in the 
Federal Register, while subsection (a)(2) lists specific records which must be made avail- 
able to the public. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(2) (1976). 
11. See note 8 supra. 
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). See also S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 
( 1965). 
13. 5 U.S.C. 8 552(c) (1976). 
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sive.14 In the second provision, Congress attempted to prevent 
agency abuse by giving federal courts specific statutory review 
powers over agency decisions denying access to requested 
records.15 The courts are given power to enjoin agencies from 
withholding records and to order the production of records which 
are unjustifiably withheld? The burden of justifying a decision 
to deny access is upon the agency." 
A critical question raised early in the FOIA's history was 
whether the balance struck had been cast in stone, or whether 
Congress left the Act flexible enough to admit of minor adjust- 
ments by the courts.18 By adding subsection (c), which limited 
exemptions to the Act to those specifically listed in the Act, Con- 
gress seemed to be eliminating the discretion of all interpreters, 
whether administrative or judicial. However, considering the vol- 
ume and variety of governmental recordkeeping, it should be ap- 
parent that any attempt to exhaustively enumerate the individ- 
ual and public interests in need of protection must of necessity 
fall short of conclusiveness.19 In this respect Professor Kenneth 
Culp Davis has observed that although Congress has the power 
to limit interpreters to the specific provisions of an act, "it may 
be very unwise in exercising this power. Its own competence to 
make law on a complex subject may be so limited that it should 
invite, not prevent, the help of administrative and judicial inter- 
preters to make its enactments workable and sensible."20 
The most potent avenue for allowing flexibility in FOIA cases 
was the argument that, despite subsection (c), courts retain their 
inherent ,power of equitable discretion in the issuance of FOIA 
injunctions. Unfortunately, perhaps, that argument has generally 
been rejected." As will be shown later in this Comment, some 
recognition of the courts' equitable discretion may be vital to a 
reasoned application of the policies underlying the FOIA. Other 
theories that would allow for flexibility, such as a broad reading 
14. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,679 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Davis, supra note 
1, at 783. 
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(~) (1976). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See Davis, supra note 1, at 766-67. 
19. An excellent illustration of Congress' failure to enumerate many of the public 
interests in need of protection can be found in the rise of "reverse FOIA" suits. See 
generally Comment, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information 
in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 995 (1976). 
20. Davis, supra note 1, at 784. 
21. For a discussion of the status of the equitable discretion doctrine, see notes 79- 
103 and accompanying text infra. 
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of the statutory exemptions, have also been rejected.22 However, 
one such avenue to flexibility, the claim that certain types of 
information are not records within the purview of the FOIA, un- 
like other arguments, has met with some positive results. 
B. Two Approaches to the Record Question 
Cases dealing with the question of whether an item requested 
under the FOIA is a record have developed two different analyti- 
cal approaches. With the first approach the court resorts to dic- 
tionaries and other sources to develop a denotative definition 
dispositive of the case; the second approach involves the court's 
consideration of policy issues. These approaches are best illus- 
trated by two cases. 
1. Nichols v. United Statesz3 
In Nichols v. United States, a district court was faced with 
deciding whether the FOIA entitled a licensed and qualified path- 
ologist to have access to certain physical objects associated with 
the assassination of President Kennedy.24 Nichols hoped to per- 
form his own tests on the items and compare his results with 
those reached by the Warren Commission. The Government re- 
sisted, contending that the objects were not records subject to 
disclosure under the FOIA and, additionally, were statutorily 
exempted from disclosure under subsection (b)(3)% even if they 
could be considered records. 
The district court, although sympathizing with Nichols' de- 
22. See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). 
Arguments have also been made that certain governmental organizations are not 
agencies, freeing them from the strictures of FOIA disclosure requirements. See, e.g., 
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir.1971) (reversing district court determina- 
tion that the Office of Science and Technology is not an agency); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 
Matthews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (University Group Diabetes Program 
not an agency). 
Congress resolved this problem by adding a definition of "agency" that is nearly all- 
inclusive. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). 
23. 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972). For a similar case, see Save the Dolphins v. United 
States Dep't of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
24. Nichols requested, among other things, access to the coat and shirt worn by 
President Kennedy at  the moment of his assassination, a 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano 
rifle believed to be the weapon used by Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination, several 
bullets and cartridge cases, metal fragments removed from Governor Connally's wrist and 
from President Kennedy's brain, and histological preparations made as a part of the 
Bethesda autopsy. 325 F. Supp. a t  135-37. 
25. See note 8 supra. 
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sires, agreed with the Government on both grounds.26 In evaluat- 
ing the argument that the objects were not records, the court 
found little guidance in the statute or its accompanying regula- 
tions. It did find help, however, in "a dictionary of respected 
ancestry," and in reliance on the dictionary concluded that a 
record is an "evidence of something written, said or done and is 
not kept to gratify the curious or susp ic i~us . "~~  Under that defini- 
tion the court found that most of the items requested were not 
records and, therefore, were not subject to the FOIA disclosure 
requirements. The decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit on 
the statutory exemption The circuit court found it un- 
necessary to address the record question since it determined that 
all the items requested by the plaintiff were exempted by subsec- 
tion (b) (3) .29 
2. SDC Development Corp. v. Matthews30 
The second illustrative case was decided by the Ninth Cir- 
cuit in 1976. SDC Development Corporation, the plaintiff- 
appellant, sought a copy of the MEDLARS tapes-a computer- 
ized compilation of over two million abstracts of medical articles 
developed by the National Library of Medicine. Since the tapes 
were already available to the public,31 the conflict actually cen- 
26. While holding for the government on both issues, Judge Templar made it quite 
clear that he did so only because he felt compelled by the Act. Among other things, he 
stated: 
Until Congress sees fit to wipe out these exemptions, so far as it is constitu- 
tionally able to do so, a person in plaintiffs position, though he be possessed 
with superb qualifications, has the purest intentions and be ever so objective in 
his research and entitled to pursue it, will be thwarted by the influence and 
presures exerted by bureaucrats which will likely hamper his investigations, no 
matter how noble and patriotic his purpose. 
325 F. Supp. at  138. 
27. Id. a t  135. 
28. Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 
(1972). 
29. At that time, subsection (b)(3) exempted any records which were "specifically 
exempted from disclosure by statute." The statute relied upon by the court is one which 
authorizes the government archives to receive gifts, subject to restrictions placed upon by 
the gifts by the donor. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107, 2108(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
Subsection (b)(3) has since been amended in order to more closely define the phrase 
"specifically exempted from disclosure'by statute." See note 8 supra. I t  is doubtful that 
the statute relied upon by the court would qualify under the amended section. 
30. 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976). 
31. The MEDLARS tapes are available to the public by subscription to MEDLINE, 
an on-line computer terminal, a t  rates of $15 per hour a t  peak use time and $8 per hour 
a t  other times. A copy of the tapes may be purchased outright a t  a cost of $50,000, 
although their accuracy is only guaranteed for one year. Id. a t  1117-18. 
414 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
tered not on access to the tapes but on their cost. Plaintiff 
claimed that the FOIA entitled him to a copy a t  the cost of 
reproducing the tapes,32 while the library claimed authority to set 
its own price? 
Faced with this unique situation, the court noted that the 
agency was not attempting to hide its operations from public 
view-the practice a t  which the FOIA was primarily aimed. Nei- 
ther was the library guilty of withholding information. Its pur- 
pose, the court concluded, was merely to protect its method of 
information distribution and, ultimately, its ability to collect in- 
formation." To make the tapes available under the FOIA's nomi- 
nal cost provisions, the court noted, could seriously impair the 
operations of the library.35 
To avoid such harm to the library, the court concluded that 
the MEDLARS tapes "are not 'records' or 'agency records' which 
must be made available . . . pursuant to [the FOIA]."36 In 
reaching this conclusion, it relied upon a Supreme Court state- 
ment that "the FOIA must be read in a manner consistent with 
previously existing statutes, insofar as such reading is compatible 
with the Act's  purpose^."^' To avoid possible conflict with the 
National Library of Medicine the court read the FOIA as 
requiring disclosure of only those records which "directly reflect 
the structure, operation, or decision-making functions of the 
agency."39 Since the tapes did not fit into any of these categories, 
the court reasoned, they could not be termed records and were 
therefore unavailable under the Act. 
32. Under the FOIA, an agency is allowed to charge a reasonable fee in order to cover 
the costs of searching and duplicating the material requested. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) 
(1976). Plaintiff submitted a check for $500 with his request, the amount he estimated 
would cover the searching and duplicating costs. 
33. The provisions of the National Library of Medicine Act allow the library to charge 
users of its materials a fee which, in its discretion, may exceed the costs of finding and 
copying the materials. See National Library of Medicine Act § 372(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 
276(c)(2)(1970); Independent Offices Appropriations Act tit. V, 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970); 
Bureau of the Budget [now Office of Management and Budget], Circular No. A-25 (Sept. 
23, 1959). These provisions have been generally recognized as allowing the agency to 
recoup some of its expenses in compiling and producing these materials. Cf. National 
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (recoupment impossible 
unless agency provides special benefit to recipient). 
34. 542 F.2d a t  1120. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. a t  1118 (citing FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975)). 
38. 42 U.S.C. $8 275-280a (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
39. 542 F.2d a t  1120. 
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3. A comparison of  the cases 
In each of the above cases, the term "record" was a threshold 
requirement. Because the FOIA only purports to require disclo- 
sure of records, in order to qualify for FOIA disclosure an item of 
information must have the characteristics which allow it to be 
classified as a record. The cases, however, present quite different 
approaches to the question of whether an item of information is 
a record disclosable under the Act. 
In Nichols the court made that determination turn on a sim- 
ple definition of the term "record." By so doing, the court en- 
deavored to treat the term in a traditional, commonsense man- 
ner, independent of its usage in the Act. The public importance 
of the information that could be gleaned from the objects, al- 
though great, played no part in determining the characteristics 
of a record. The SDC Development case, on the other hand, con- 
cerned itself with issues of public policy in delineating the record 
threshold. I t  was not contended that in common terminology the 
MEDLARS tapes were not records. Nevertheless, because of the 
devastating effect the FOIA's nominal cost disclosure would 
wreak upon the MEDLARS program, the court developed a spe- 
cialized definition of "record." That definition turned upon an 
analysis of the Act's purpose rather than an independent inter- 
pretation of the meaning of the term. 
Since the SDC Development approach focuses upon whether 
public policy dictates that an item of information should be dis- 
closed, i t  will be referred to herein as the policy approach. The 
Nichols approach will be labeled the definitional approach.40 
The definitional and the policy approaches have the poten- 
tial of causing diametrically opposite results in an identical case. 
Had the Nichols court used the policy approach applied in SDC 
Development, for example, it could well have concluded that the 
items were of sufficient public importance to outweigh any possi- 
ble detrimental effect on governmental programs. Conversely, 
had the MEDLARS tapes been subjected to the definitional ap- 
proach, they may have been considered records. 
40. Others have suggested different approaches to defining the term "record" than 
those which will be treated herein. For example, in Note, The Freedom of Information 
Act-A Potential Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
73 (1976), one commentator suggests that a definition of "record" might be approached 
in terms of form or in terms of the agency's purpose for holding it. However, he rejects 
the latter as productive of results inconsistent with the Act, id. at 100-01, and the treat- 
ment of "record" in terms of physical form alone is oversjmplistic. See note 56 and 
accompanying text infra. 
416 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
Given the distinction between the two approaches, it is ap- 
propriate to inquire into the proper role of each. Is there a place 
for purely definitional considerations, or should the availability 
of every item of information turn upon a "balanced appraisal of 
the policies underlying disclosure and e ~ e m p t i o n " ? ~ ~  Which ap- 
proach better satisfies the legislative intent behind the FOIA? 
And, is there an alternative approach which allows a court flexi- 
bility to reach sensible results consistent with the policies of the 
Act? 
The balance of this Comment will focus on these questions. 
First the definitional approach will be analyzed in terms of rea- 
son, principles of statutory construction, and the FOIA's legisla- 
tive history and purpose. Attention will then turn to the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of the policy approach. That analysis 
will lead to a suggested model for dealing with the threshold 
record requirement and to a preferable method for responding to 
the questions the policy approach attempts to answer. 
There are a variety of aids available in the search for a proper 
definition of the word "record" in a government recordkeeping 
setting. The Nichols court, for example, turned to statutory and 
regulatory definitions, a dictionary, and Words and Phrases in 
the course of its search.42 Also available are the well-recognized 
principles of statutory construction. This section will briefly eval- 
uate the merits of these various aids in arriving a t  a proper defini- 
tion of the term "record," and will then turn to a discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a definitional ap- 
proach to the record requirement. 
A. Aids to Finding a Proper Definition 
1.  Principles of statutory interpretation 
Courts have frequently been required to interpret or construe 
the meaning of disputed statutory language, and a substantial 
body of principles of statutory construction has resulted.43 All 
such principles are, in theory, aimed at  serving the intent of the 
legislature. Although some scholars have criticized the search for 
legislative intent," "it is an article of faith among American law- 
41. FOIA Assessment, supra note 1, at 904 n.55. 
42. 325. F. Supp. at 134-35. 
43. See generally C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1973). 
44. In what has been termed the "Radin Onslaught," Dickerson, Statutory Interpre- 
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yers that the function of a court when dealing with a statute is 
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legi~lature."~~ 
Despite this unity of purpose, the methodology of statutory 
interpretation can vary widely. At one end of the scale is the 
approach that emphasizes the search of historical and legislative 
materials for answers to questions of const ru~t ion.~~ As applied to 
the problem of interpreting the term "record," however, the value 
of the historical approach is minimal. No piece of legislative his- 
tory speaks to the point.47 While a consideration of the FOIA's 
tation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 h ~ .  L.J. 206, 207 (1975), 
Professor Radin attacked the notion of "legislative intent" as being, among other things, 
a contradiction in terms. How, he asked, can one speak of the intent of a collective body? 
If such a concept can even exist, how can it be objectively ascertained to any degree of 
reliability? Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930). Since 
that time many competent scholars have joined in this philosophical debate. See generally 
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation, " 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Mac Callum, 
Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and 
the Use of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A 
Reexamination, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 128 (1972). 
45. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory In- 
terpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975). 
46. Under this methodology, the historical setting of legislation, legislative history, 
implicit policies, and other such indications of intent are deemed most important in 
determining the meaning of a word, phrase, or section of a statute. See 2A C. SANDS, supra 
note 43, $0 47.06, 48.02-.03, 49.01-.03. 
47. The most pertinent piece of legislative history is a technical amendment made 
by the 89th Congress to S. 1160, the precursor of the FOIA. Before the amendment, 
subsection (c) (now subsection (a)(4)) read: "[TJhe district court . . . shall have jurisdic- 
tion to enjoin the agency from the withholding of agency records and information and to 
order the production of any agency records or information improperly withheld from the 
complainant." Administrative Bocedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and 
S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965) (emphasis added). In statements 
submitted to the subcommittee, the Departments of Agriculture and Defense, NASA, and 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare observed that the inclusion of the words "and 
information" served but to confuse the scope of the term "records." Id. at  382, 416, 483, 
497. 
NASA's comment was somewhat broader than the rest, and is especially pertinent: 
There is no precise meaning attached to the term "records" as it appears 
in the subsection. It could mean any document or item containing information 
in the possession of the agency including such diverse objects as contracts, 
invoices, transcription belts, and tape recordings. Moreover, there later appears 
in the subsection the phrase "records and information." I t  is not clear whether 
the  term "records," when i t  first appears, is intended to encompass 
"information" as well. And what does information mean opposed to "records"? 
If it means something different from records, then it would not be available 
under agency procedures which only encompass means of acquiring "records," 
leaving "information" to be acquired through court process. 
Id. at 483. 
Presumably because of these comments, the phrases "and information" and "or 
information" were deleted in committee. S. REP. NO. 813,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965). 
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history discloses that it was meant to make more information in 
agency files available to the public, that purpose has little proba- 
tive value as to the intended scope of such disclosure. 
At the other end of the methodological scale is the literal- 
istic approach to statutory construction. This approach relies 
heavily on the statute itself, applying principles developed over 
time to aid in ferreting out the meaning of ambiguous terms." As 
with the first method, most literalistic principles give little guid- 
ance in resolving the present question. The Act does not define 
the term. While the duplication and document search provision49 
implies that  a record must have certain  characteristic^,^^ the 
Act's emphasis on simply making agency records available 
dilutes the strength of any such inference. The Act did not set out 
to describe records-only to make them available. 
One literalistic principle of statutory interpretation, how- 
ever, does lend some direction. When commonly used terms have 
been employed by a legislature, i t  is generally recognized that 
they should be given their "common meaning? As Justice 
Frankfurter explained, "legislation when not expressed in techni- 
cal terms is addressed to the common run of men and is therefore 
to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the ordi- 
nary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to 
The most this delection can indicate, however, is that the committee intended that infor- 
mation be contained in a record before it becomes available under the FOIA. I t  says 
nothing about the scope of the term "record," nor does it intimate any idea of the types 
of items which might be considered by the courts or the agencies. 
The problem at  which the amendment was probably aimed is illustrated in Electronic 
Memories & Magnetics Corp. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 356 (C.D. Cal. 1977), wherein 
the plaintiff requested a narrative explanation of some factual determinations made re- 
garding him by an agency. Id. at 359-60. That request would have required the compila- 
tion of information into a record, not the production of information already in recorded 
form. 
48. Such principles include the "plain-meaning" rule, the familiar rule of ejusdern 
generis, and "whole statute" interpretation, among others. See generally 2A C .  SANDS, 
supra note 43, $9 46.05, 47.01-.38; Murphy, note 45 supra. 
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976). 
50. See Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263 (1967). The memorandum 
concludes that the emphasis upon the right to a copy forecloses the possibility that 
"objects or articles such as structures, furniture, paintings, sculpture, three-dimensional 
models, vehicles, equipment, etc., whatever their historical value or value 'as evidence"' 
would fall within the records classidication. id. ,  reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263,291 (1967). 
But see Note, The Freedom of Information Act-A Potential Alternative to Conventional 
Criminal Discovery, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 100-01 (1976). 
51. For different formulations of the "common meaning" rule, see 2A C. SANDS, supra 
note 43, 9 47.28. 
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him."52 Although the common meaning principle is necessarily 
vague, where legislative history and other aids are wholly absent 
it seems to be the most reliable indicator of legislative intent 
available. 
2. Definitions: dictionaries, unrelated statutes, and regulations 
Definitions of the term "record" can be found in dictionaries, 
agency regulations adopted in response to the FOIA, and unre- 
lated statutes. There are two common types of definitions, the 
descriptive and the illustrative. A descriptive definition of the 
word "record" is found in all dictionaries, and is an abstract 
statement of the qualities possessed by the class of items called 
"records." For example, the Nichols court cited Webster's New 
International Dictionary and Webster 's  N e w  Collegiate 
Dictionary, both of which define "record" as "that which is writ- 
ten or transcribed to perpetuate knowledge. . . ."53 A more re- 
cent edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary speaks in 
somewhat less general terms: "[Slomething that recalls or re- 
lates past events, an official document that records the acts of a 
public body or officer, an authentic official copy of a document 
deposited with a legally designated officer . . . . "54 
The illustrative definition, common to statutory and regula- 
tory materials, tends to be an enumeration of the types of articles 
which are classified as records. Most agencies have adopted regu- 
latory definitions in response to the FOIA, the majority of which 
follow the pattern set by a statute relating to the management 
and disposal of records by the Administrator of General Ser- 
v i c e ~ : ~ ~  
"[R]ecords" includes all books, papers, maps, photographs, 
machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, 
52. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944). Justice Frank- 
furter also observed: "To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is one 
thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal meaning of 
words is quite another." Id. a t  617. 
In that case, the Court refused to allow the Administrator of the Wage and Hour 
Division of the Department of Labor to define the "area of production" exception to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act in any terms other than geographical. The Administrator had 
defined that word both in terms of geography and number of employees. 
53. 325 F. Supp. at  135. 
54. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 966 (1974 ed. ) . 
55. Examples of regulations defining "record" for purposes of the FOIA can be found 
in: 7 C.F.R. # 661.3 (1977) (Soil Conservation Service); 14 C.F.R. # 310.2(a) (1977) (CAB); 
14 C.F.R. § 1206.101(a) (1977) (NASA); 22 C.F.R. § 6.l(b) (1977) (Dep't of State); 32 
C.F.R. § 701.4 (1976) (Dep't of the Navy); 32 C.F.R. § 1900.3(g) (1977) (CIA); 41 C.F.R. 
# 105-60.103(a) (1977) (GSA); 45 C.F.R. 6 5.5 (1976) (Dep't of HEW). 
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regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received 
by an agency of the United States Government under Federal 
law or in connection with the transaction of public business and 
preserved or appropriate for preservation . . . as evidence of the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, opera- 
tions, or other activities of the Government or because of the 
informational value of data in them. Library and museum mate- 
rial made or acquired and preserved only for convenience of 
reference, and stocks of publications and of processed docu- 
ments are not included.56 
3. A commonsense meaning 
Some of the aids discussed above have as their objective a 
generally applicable description of the term "record"; others are 
aimed a t  the special setting of government recordkeeping. All of 
them, within their own settings, try to arrive a t  the commonsense 
meaning of the term. It might be helpful a t  this point to inquire 
independently into the notions which form the core of the concept 
"record" in a government recordkeeping context in order to lend 
some perspective to  the definitional sources described above. 
What follows is by no means a test by which all items can be 
classified as records or nonrecords, but is rather an attempt to 
articulate some of the factors to be considered in arriving a t  a 
satisfactory definition. 
First, in the governmental recordkeeping setting a record 
presupposes information preserved by design. If an item does not 
contain any information, or if information is preserved only by 
happenstance, i t  should not usually be considered a record. Con- 
cededly, in other contexts the word "record" can refer to items 
which do not follow this pattern. For example, in other contexts 
a murder weapon, geological formations, and a person's memory 
could be considered records, although they cannot be said to con- 
tain information that is preserved by design. However, it is quite 
unlikely that, by enacting the FOIA, Congress intended to require 
disclosure of these items. 
A second notion which seems to be involved is that a record 
is usually intended to be a convenient method of preserving infor- 
mation. For example, a scientist does not save for posterity the 
chemicals he has combined; rather, he preserves his notes and 
observations. Abstractions such as ideas and policies must neces- 
sarily be placed in a more convenient form than memory in order 
56. 44 U.S.C.A. 9 3301 (West 1977). 
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to form an agency record. Still, a record need not be the most 
convenient form of information storage, but only a more conve- 
nient form than that in which the information had its genesis. 
Similarly, the notion of convenience does not mandate that a 
record be of a certain physical form, such as written or printed. 
Computer tapes, punched cards, movies, and so on can easily be 
included within its scope. 
In drawing the line between records and nonrecords, the 
court's guiding star should be the Act's stated policy of achieving 
the greatest level of agency disclosure consistent with governmen- 
tal interests in need of protection. Consistent with that policy, if 
error is to be made in formulating a commonsense meaning of the 
term "record," it should be made on the side of overinclusiveness 
rat her than underinclusiveness . 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Definitional Approach 
One commentator has suggested that a purely definitional 
approach to the question of whether an item is a record within 
the scope of the FOIA is over~implistic.~' That is, to enter into any 
analysis which largely ignores the policies favoring and disfavor- 
ing disclosure could result in decisions that frustrate rather than 
effectuate the FOIA's purpose. One is nevertheless uncomfortable 
with a blanket rejection of definitional analysis, since the impli- 
cation of a strict policy approach is that any object or article 
could be considered a record if the reason for disclosure is suffi- 
ciently compelling. Congress could have used language that in- 
cluded any object or article, but it chose not to do s ~ . ~ ~  The term 
"record" is not all-inclusive. Rather, some sort of basic qualita- 
tive characterization is necessary as a threshold. 
The principle drawback of the definitional approach is that 
arriving a t  any definition comfortably dividing the world into 
records and nonrecords is diffcult, if not impossible. The descrip- 
tive definition and the common meaning approach are too ab- 
stract to be of decisive weight in borderline cases; the illustrative 
definition, because of its specificity, tends to be underinclusive. 
Moreover, illustrative definitions are often written with a particu- 
lar context in mind; their applicability to a different situation 
may be que~tionable.~~ 
57. FOIA Assessment, supra note 1, at 904 n.55. 
58. See note 47 supra. 
59. "The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, 
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same 
scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of orginial 
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It is of some consolation that this drawback of the defini- 
tional approach is not unique to the FOIA context. In constitu- 
tional litigation, for example, courts have found ways of dealing 
with the problem of vague standards,60 and there seems to be no 
reason to expect a contrary result in FOIA cases. The vagaries of 
constitutional standards are much greater than those of the defi- 
nition of "record." 
III. THE POLICY APPROACH 
The policy approach to setting forth what constitutes a re- 
cord, like the definitional approach, is a method of determining 
the scope of disclosure that may be compelled under the FOIA. 
Unlike the definitional approach, which defines "record" without 
reference to the FOIA's special purposes, the policy approach is 
an attempt to deal with policy problems in the determination of 
whether or not an item of information is disclosable upon proper 
reque~t .~ '  In theory, under this approach a court could order dis- 
closure when, under the definitional approach, the item would 
not be classified as a record. Conversely, as illustrated by SDC 
Development, a court might refuse to order disclosure of an item 
of information that would normally be classified as a record. 
The factors which could bear on the disclosure or withholding 
of information under the policy approach are potentially as nu- 
merous and varied as the types of records compiled by the several 
agen~ies; '~ any attempt to list and evaluate them is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. Rather than discuss individual policies, 
this Section will evaluate the policy approach in the abstract. 
A. Advantages of the Policy Approach 
It has been suggested that any determination of whether an 
sin and must constantly be guarded against." W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1949). 
60. Probably the best example of vague constitutional standards is found in the first 
amendment free speech cases. For a discussion of several ways that the Supreme Court 
has attempted to deal with that problem, see Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times 
to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. 
L. REV. 935, 939-42 (1968). 
61. See FOIA Assessment, supra note 1, a t  904 n.55. 
62. One of the difficulties with the policy approach is that it can potentially involve 
policies external to the FOIA. In SDC Development, for example, reliance was placed 
upon the importance of the recoupment powers of the National Library of Medicine. 542 
F.2d a t  1120. In Nichols, the court might have relied upon the importance of the govern- 
ment archives' ability to protect donors' wishes. What about a request for a NASA com- 
puter program that could design spaceship components? The possibilities are endless. 
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item of information should be disclosed should turn exclusively 
upon policy  consideration^.^^ Two advafitages to this kind of 
policy-based decision are evident. 
First, by allowing a court to use the record requirement as a 
means of withholding information that would otherwise be dis- 
closed under the Act, the FOIA is given a flexibility of interpreta- 
tion that it would lack under a strict definitional approach. In the 
SDC Development context, for example, if the court had followed 
a strict definitional approach it may have required disclosure of 
the MEDLARS tapes, since they would most likely be considered 
records to which no statutory exemption appliedeB4 That result, 
which would merely reduce the cost of tapes already publicly 
available, would have significantly harmed the National Library 
of Medicine's program. The policy approach gave the court a 
rationale to justify its clearly equitable result within the tradi- 
tional framework of the Act. 
A second advantage of the policy approach is related to the 
first. By treating each record question in terms of policy, some 
items of information which traditionally would not be considered 
records may nevertheless become available for public scrutiny. 
The Nichols case is illustrative. Assuming for the present that no 
statutory exemption applied to the articles requested in that case, 
their informational value could possibly have allowed their dis- 
closure when weighed against countervailing considerations. 
B. Disadvantages of the Policy Approach 
As discussed earlier, Congress is not omnicompetent in legis- 
lating on complex matters.65 In considering the balance that 
should be struck in freedom of information legislation, it could 
not deal with all the special problems raised by the infinite vari- 
ety of governmental records. As with most legislation, the FOIA 
evidences only the broad policy judgments that should play an 
important role in the statute's administration? 
Nevertheless, instead of inviting courts and agencies to use 
these policy judgments as the basis for an independent determi- 
63. FOIA Assessment, supra note 1, at 904 n.55. 
64. For an argument that another means of withholding the tapes is availab1e;see 
notes 79-103 and accompanying text infra. 
65. Notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. 
66. In this respect, the FOIA resembles the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
$ 9  151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), much more closely than the Internal Revenue Code. 
Using that analogy, it could be concluded that broad discretion, like that given the 
National Labor Relations Board, should be given to the courts in FOIA administration. 
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nation of the applicability of the Act to specific types of informa- 
tion, Congress seemingly restricted them to a consideration of the 
specific factors listed in the Act!' By SO doing, Congress limited 
the courts' role in the administration of the FOIA. The policy 
approach tends to undercut this limited role by allowing courts 
to go outside the specific factors listed in the Act and, in effect, 
to add a judicially created exemption to itY It is unlikely that the 
Act's sponsors contemplated licensing courts to determine 
whether an item is or is not a record by reference to the same 
criteria that led to creation of the statutory exemptions. 
Because of this limited role, courts are embarking on a dan- 
gerous journey when they begin to use policy considerations to 
withhold information not specifically exempted by the FOIA. 
This problem is compounded since the exemption comes at  the 
threshold determination. In cases where policy problems are 
raised, the variety of considerations which could potentially enter 
into different cases makes it difficult to define a threshold equally 
applicable to all cases. For example, the threshold developed in 
SDC Development was that of records which touch upon "the 
structure, operation, or decision-making functions of the 
agency."69 Yet in several cases, records having little to do with 
any of these criteria have been disclosed.70 
Possibly the most serious problem with the policy approach 
is that it tends to mask the true issue with a ficticious While 
purporting to define "record," the court is actually balancing the 
considerations for and against disclosure. The court asks whether 
the item is a record for FOIA purposes instead of the real ques- 
tion: Despite the lack of a statutory exemption, do special consid- 
erations require that the record be withheld from the public? 
Placing policy analysis into a definitional framework is a return 
to the immature jurisprudence of making "a fortress out of the 
di~tionary;"'~ litigants are encouraged to invent strained defini- 
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976); notes 13-14, 18-20 and accompanying text supra. 
68. See 80 HARV. L. REV. 909, 911 (1966). 
69. 542 F.2d a t  1120. 
70. E.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (lists of employees eligible 
to vote in union representation elections); Save the Dolphins v. United States Dep't of 
Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (movie about commercial fishing tech- 
niques). 
71. This criticism has arisen in other legal contexts. For example, see Professor 
Green's criticism of the proximate cause doctrine in L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE (1927). A similar criticism has been levied in the satutory interpretation context 
against the "plain-meaning" rule. Murphy, supra note 45. 
72. This phrase is borrowed from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Cabell v. Mark- 
ham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Hand's entire statement is worthy of note: "[at 
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tions of a term in order to justify a decision which should result 
from a more straightforward argument. 
Despite its drawbacks, however, a complete rejection of a 
policy analysis is discomforting. To deprive the courts of what 
little flexibility they possess, turning their decisions into mechan- 
ical applications of the Act, would lead to as many detrimental 
results as beneficial ones. Thus, in any model developed, some 
means of using policy analysis to achieve a level of flexibility 
must be retained. 
IV. A MODEL FOR ANALYZING THE RECORD QUESTION 
In the previous sections the advantages and disadvantages of 
definitional and policy approaches to the record question have 
been discussed. With that background, attention will now turn to 
a consideration of the proper role for each approach. Should one 
or the other be used in making the threshold determination of 
what constitutes a record? Can both play some part in the FOIA's 
interpretation? What practical considerations might a court con- 
sider in answering the question of whether an item is or is not a 
record subject to disclosure under the Act? 
A. Defining the Threshold 
1. Choosing a n  approach 
In defining what is meant by the record threshold, courts 
could take either or both of the approaches outlined above. How- 
ever, the use of different approaches by different courts, or even 
by the same court in different circumstances, can only result in 
inconsistency and uncertainty. I t  seems preferable, therefore, to 
consistently apply either one or the other. 
The policy approach gives a court flexibility, albeit a flexibil- 
ity which Congress did not likely intend. By determining policy 
under the guise of defining "record," the record requirement be- 
comes a tool to achieve results seemingly forbidden by the Act, 
yet desirable in terms of public interest. This artificial use of the 
record requirement does not seem warranted unless no other ave- 
nue exists for permitting courts the flexibility they need. 
The definitional approach, on the other hand, does not allow 
for the flexibility provided by the policy approach, but has the 
is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress 
out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object 
to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their 
meaning." Id. at 739. 
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discrete advantage of being a more accurate threshold. There is 
no indication that Congress meant the term "record" to be used 
in other than a traditional manner. With the exception of border- 
line cases, the definitional test is consistent and relatively easy 
to apply, and because most requests under the FOIA are for items 
that are clearly records under the definitional approach, the bor- 
derline cases will be rare. Since, as shall be argued herein, an 
acceptable means of achieving flexibility through policy analysis 
does exist,73 the definitional approach should be used to define 
the threshold record requirement. In using the definitional ap- 
proach, there are several practical considerations that should be 
addressed. 
2. Deciding the record question 
Before addressing the task of defining the term "record," a 
court would be wise to consider whether the case can be decided 
on alternative grounds. Since there is no easy answer to a close 
question of whether an item is a record, there seems to be no 
reason to initiate an inquiry fraught with uncertainties when a 
more commonly traveled path will lead to a conclusive determi- 
nation of the case. One example of an alternative ground for 
deciding a case would be a statutory exemption from disclosure 
available to the agency.74 Another example might be when an 
agency's own definition of "record" clearly includes the item in 
question within its scope, since those definitions are binding upon 
the agency.75 
If there is no alternative ground for deciding the case, the 
court must determine whether the requested information fits 
within the term "record." It would appear that an ad hoc deter- 
mination of cases would be preferable to trying to determine an 
all-inclusive definition-one which comfortably divides the world 
- 
73. See notes 79-103 and accompanying text infra. 
74. In this regard, the Tenth Circuit's example in Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 
671, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972), is instructive. The district court noted that the 
items requested by the plaintiff, even if they were records, were exempt from disclosure 
under the FOIA. 325 F. Supp. a t  136-37. The Tenth Circuit based its decision exclusively 
on that rationale, finding it unnecessary to even consider the record question. 460 F.2d at 
673. 
75. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957). 
Although in some cases agencies have been allowed to violate their own regulations, 
e.g., American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970), those 
cases have generally dealt with internal agency procedures rather than with the protection 
of an adverse party's interests. See Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own 
Regulations, 87 HAW. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (1974). See also Berger, Do Regulations Really 
Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 137 (1967). 
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into records and nonre~ords.'~ Of course, the drawback to any ad 
hoc approach is the lack of guidance it gives to the public, the 
agencies, and the lower However, under this model the 
question of whether an item is truly a record will be rather rare. 
The overwhelming majority of requests have been, and will likely 
continue to be, for items of information that fit squarely within 
the common conception of the term. Because the issue does not 
commonly arise, there seems to be little need to formulate a defi- 
nition that would probably lead to more problems than solutions. 
In making an ad hoc determination, a court would turn to the 
definitional approach for a standard. By consulting statutory and 
dictionary sources, and by employing the common meaning rule 
discussed above, the court can formulate an idea of how the char- 
acteristics of the item in question square with the term "record." 
After a sufficient number of cases arise which present this ques- 
tion, a court might even be able to generalize from past experi- 
ences and, a t  least in part, do away with the ad hoc approach by 
formulating a rule based upon that experience. 
The result of adopting a definitional approach to the record 
threshold is to place a low threshold on the availability of infor- 
mation under the FOIA. Almost all requests for information will 
concern items that easily fall within the commonplace notions of 
the term "record." This result is entirely consistent with, if not 
mandated by, the FOIA's object of achieving the greatest level of 
disclosure consistent with legitimate governmental  interest^.'^ 
B. An Alternative Method of Achieving Flexibility 
By adopting the definitional approach as the exclusive 
means of answering the record question, the flexibility inherent 
in the policy approach is lost. An alternative means of achieving 
that flexibility lies in a limited return to the doctrine of equitable 
discretion, based upon the court's inherent equitable powers at- 
tendant to the issuance of injunctions. 
1. Background of the equitable discretion doctrine 
Soon after the passage of the Act, it was advocated that 
courts have power independent of the Act to refuse to enjoin an 
76. At this point in our experience of dealing with the record question under the FOIA 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an effective standard for determining 
whether or not an item is a record. 
77. Nimmer, supra note 60, at 939-42. 
78. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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agency from withholding record~ .~Wnce  that time, strong argu- 
ments have been made both for and against the judicial exercise 
of equitable power in FOIA cases.80 The primary objections to the 
exercise of equitable discretion, or balancing the equities, have 
been twofold. First, the statute and its legislative history have 
been interpreted so as to deny the courts any right to refuse 
injunctive relief on grounds other than those specified in the 
Act?' Second, it is feared that the exercise of broad equitable 
79. Davis, supra note 1, a t  767. 
80. "Much ink has been spilled on this issue, both by courts and commentators 
. . . ." Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 
352 (1976). See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067,1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (no equitable 
discretion); id. a t  1083-84 (Wilkey, J., concurring) (equitable discretion exists); FOIA 
Assessment, supra note 1, a t  911-20 (equitable discretion exists); Note, Judicial Discretion 
and the Freedom of Information Act: Disclosure Denied: Consumers Union v. Veterans 
Administration, 45 IND. L.J. 421 (1970) (no equitable discretion). 
Despite the extensive comments, however, the Ninth Circuit is presently the only 
circuit expressly allowing equitable discretion. See Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 
390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974); GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969). In Theriault 
the court noted: 
We realize that a given agency might fail to show a specific exemption 
protecting a given record and yet in good faith claim that dire adverse potential- 
ities will occur and result from a disclosure of a given record. 
". . . In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of 
Information Act, the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclo- 
sure, according to traditional equity principles, and determine the best course 
to follow in the given circumstances. The effect on the public is the primary 
consideration." 
503 F.2d at  392 (quoting GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d at  880). 
Despite this attitude, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have split on the issue. 
Accord, Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637, 641-42 (C.D. Cal. 1975), on remand 
from 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974); Long v. United States IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 873, 875 
(W.D. Wash. 1972). Contra, Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of Justice, 410 
F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Save the Dolphins v. United States Dep't of Com- 
merce, 404 F. Supp. 407, 413 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 
771, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum). 
For the status of the equitable discretion doctrine in the other circuits, see notes 91- 
92 infra. 
81. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Cases denying the existence of equitable powers rely upon subsection (c) of the Act 
(subsection (f) of the original bill) and its explanatory section in the Senate report, which 
states: "The purpose of this subsection is to make i t  clear beyond doubt that all materials 
of the Government are to be made available. . . unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret 
. . . ." S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) (emphasis in original). Although 
this language is also found in the House report, H.R. REP. NO. 1497,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
11, reprinted in [I9661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2429, that report also states 
that a court should issue injunctions "whenever i t  considers such action equitable and 
appropriate." Id. a t  9, [I9661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at  2426. The House report, 
however, has been dismissed as a less reliable indicator of legislative intent. Getman v. 
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In another context, however, Justice Douglas has cited the disputed 
House language approvingly. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 
34 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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power would frustrate the policies expressed in the Act. For ex- 
ample, it has been asserted that "interjection of discretion would 
result in perennial uncertainty as to the result of a particular 
case,"82 that agencies would use such discretion as a means of 
forcing requesters to court even though a strong possibility exists 
that no statutory exemption is a p p l i ~ a b l e , ~ ~  and that courts will 
disregard the policies of the Act under the guise of balancing the 
equities.84 
In response to the lack-of-power argument, commentators 
have recognized the real possibility that such discretion does exist 
in a limited sphere.85 The argument, in capsulized form, is that 
neither the statute nor its legislative history expressly forbids the 
courts from exercising their discretionary power to grant or deny 
injunctions. Since the court's equity powers cannot be revoked 
unless expressly stated in the it is argued that "the conflict 
in the language of the Act must be resolved in favor of preserving 
the equitable discretion of the district courts."87 
The second objection, based upon a fear that courts will frus- 
trate the policies of the Act, has also been answered. Commenta- 
tors have recognized that clear and workable limits can be placed 
on the exercise of such equitable power? One suggested limita- 
82. Note, Judicial Discretion and the Freedom of Information Act: Disclosure De- 
nied: Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 45 IND. L.J. 421, 432 (1970). 
83. Id. at  433-34. This problem has been mitigated in part by the 1974 amendments 
to the Act. One of those amendments provides for a review of agency employees' actions 
by the Civil Service Commission when the withholding of a record is deemed arbitrary 
and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1976). Another provides for the award of attor- 
ney's fees to successful plaintiffs. Id. 4 &%(a) (4) (E). 
84. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971). That argument seems espe- 
cially pertinent where a litigant is contending that all equitable notions (e.g., "clean 
hands" doctrine) should be applicable to FOIA cases. See, e.g., Wellman Indus., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 1974). 
85. See, e.g., Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(Miller, J., concurring); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1083-84 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, 
J., concurring); Davis, supra note 1, a t  767. 
Probably the best explication of that argument is found in FOIA Assessment, supra 
note 1, a t  911-20. Although a student work, it has been cited with great respect in cases 
and law review articles. E.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U S .  352, 370 n.7 
(1976); Clark, supra note 1, at 748 n.30. I t  forms the basis for the arguments made herein. 
86. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329-30 (1944). But see United Steelworkers 
of America v. United States, 361 U S .  39 (1959) (per curiam). For a reconciliation of these 
cases and an application of their authority to the instant problem, see FOIA Assessment, 
supra note 1, a t  915-18. 
87. FOIA Assessment, supra note 1, at  914. 
88. Id. at  918-20. Although litigants may have pressed this issue, no court or commen- 
tator has seriously argued that all equitable doctrines should be applied to FOIA mat- 
ters. The arguments for equitable discretion have generally involved a balancing-of- 
equities approach, presumably the governments' interests versus the plaintiff's interests. 
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tion is to deny injunctive relief only when a court concludes that 
the adverse impact upon governmental programs will be high and 
that the equitable interests of the person requesting the informa- 
tion are Courts that have employed the equitable discretion 
technique, although never expressly discussing the issue, have 
implicitly limited their exercise of discretion by demonstrating an 
honest respect for the underlying policies of the Act-e.g., broad 
disclosure of i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Regardless of the arguments made in favor of equitable dis- 
cretion, however, courts that have considered the issue have al- 
most uniformly found that no general equitable discretion exists 
to withhold information that is not specifically e~empted .~ '  The 
courts that have not specifically addressed the question also ap- 
pear to lean in that d i r e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Even so, it has been conceded that 
89. Id. One serious difficulty with this approach is that it considers the motives and 
interests of the individual requesting the information. Such an inquiry was expressly 
rejected with the adoption of the Act and the consequent dropping of the "directly and 
properly concerned" test under the original section. See S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5-6 (1965). 
90. Courts have been perceived as being sensitive to the FOIA's policies. Clark, supra 
note 1, a t  748, 752. 
I t  is interesting that in two of the three Ninth Circuit cases adopting the equitable 
discretion approach, the court nevertheless issued the injunction. GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 
878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); Long v. United States IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
But see Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
91. The D.C. Circuit, in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
was the first to reject the arguments favoring equitable discretion with persuasive dictum 
that was soon confirmed in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
The Fourth Circuit followed that lead in a slightly different context when, in Wellford 
v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971), it refused to balance the same interests 
Congress had considered in determining whether privacy concerns should play a part in 
the investigatory files exemption. In Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973), the 
court reconfirmed its view, and one year later nailed the lid on the coffin, saying curtly 
that subsection (c) "means what it says." Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 
429 (4th Cir. 1974). 
The Sixth Circuit has similarly rejected a general equitable approach to FOIA injunc- 
tions. Freuhauf Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1085 (1977); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 
1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 662 (6th Cir. 1972). 
92. Case law in the Second Circuit is still inconclusive. In Rose v. Department of Air 
Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), the court refused to pass on 
the issue while noting "that generally the Act constrains the use of broad judicial discre- 
tion to block disclosure." Id. a t  269-70 (emphasis in original). However, in denying a 
litigant his attorney's fees, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York mentioned that the use of equitable discretion might have been particularly 
appropriate were the case not moot. Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 904 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (letter withheld from person being investigated by grand jury a t  request of Justice 
Department despite his FOIA request). In a recent case, the same district court sua sponte 
found equitable jurisdiction to withhold portions of a pamphlet of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms entitled Raids and Searches. Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, To- 
bacco & Firearms, 77 Civ. 4313 (S.D.N.Y., decided Jan. 13, 1978). 
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there may be room for the exercise of a limited discretion in an 
appropriate case. Soucie v. David,g3 the first case to conclude 
that discretion does not exist, noted that "[tlhere may be excep- 
tional circumstances in which a court could fairly conclude that 
Congress intended to leave room for the operation of limited judi- 
cial discretion . . . ."g4 Other courts have joined in this observa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Because of the admitted possibility of an exceptional case, 
courts and commentators may not disagree as much as it would 
seem. Indeed, one court noted that the only question may be what 
constitutes an appropriate case: 
We are not sure how real the conflict is in most instances, since 
even the courts that are cited as opposing the notion of general 
equity power to refuse disclosure recognize that a truly excep- 
tional case might require it .  . . . It may be that the true contro- 
versy is over the definition of an exceptional case . . . . 96 
The process of defining "an exceptional case" and the pro- 
cess of placing proper limitations upon the exercise of equitable 
In the Third Circuit, one district court has found no equitable discretion to exist. 
Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F. 
Supp. 231, 234-36 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wine Hobby USA, 
Inc. v. United States IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit reversed that 
case on other grounds finding it unnecessary to reach the equitable discretion issue. Wine 
Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1974). 
The opinions in the Fifth Circuit are also unclear. Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 
1371, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 
1973), in which a district court found no equitable jurisdiction, was affirmed without 
mention of that issue. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973). Although a 
balance-of-equities argument was used to support nondisclosure in Wu v. National En-  
dowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 
(1973), language in a recent case seems to lead to contrary conclusion. Kent Corp. v. 
NLRB, 530 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). 
93. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
94. Id. at  1077. 
It should be noted that the case which adopted the Soucie dictum as law, although 
quoting from the opinion with approval, did not quote this language. Getman v. NLRB, 
450 F.2d 670, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This could lead to a conclusion that the court was not 
willing to allow any possibility for the exercise of discretion notwithstanding the Soucie 
dictum. However, in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.Cir. 1974), the 
court hinted that it might reconsider the Getman and Soucie holdings if an appropriate 
case were to arise. Id. a t  355. See also Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 
n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
95. This view was also adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. 
v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972), wherein the court reviewed the Soucie language and 
added that "[tlhis case does not afford any special circumstances which can properly be 
argued as overriding the statutory mandates." Id. a t  662. 
96. Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 
352 (1976) (citations omitted). This observation is in harmony with the conclusion that 
any "resort to equity would be a truly extraordinary measure, rarely invoked." FOIA 
Assessment, supra note 1, a t  920. 
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discretion are, in essence, the same. If those proper limits may be 
established, the concern that equitable discretion will frustrate 
the purpose of the Act may be alleviated. The possibility of estab- 
lishing those limits will now be explored. 
2. Equitable discretion's limited role 
Commentators have recognized that the circumstances in 
which discretion may be properly exercised will be rare,97 but how 
are those circumstances to be ascertained? Although it would be 
naive to assume that Congress considered all possibilities in en- 
acting the FOIA, it did consider several categories of informa- 
t i~n.~Vherefore ,  the exercise of equitable discretion should at  
least be limited to those categories of information not specifically 
considered by Congress when it struck the balance. If, for exam- 
ple, a requested record could be classified as an investigatory 
file,gg yet i t  was not the type of file which was exempted by the 
Act, no discretion should be available. In addition to the ex- 
empted categories of records, information which reflects the 
structure, operation, or decisionmaking processes of the agency 
should not admit to the exercise of discretion.loO 
Once a court has determined that an item of information is 
of a type which Congress did not specifically consider, other 
policies impacting on the exercise of discretion should affect the 
court's decision. The court must keep in mind the heavy pre- 
sumption favoring disclosure established by the Act.lol Thus, 
when balancing the considerations for and against disclosure, the 
scales must be heavily weighted for disclosure before discretion 
favoring secrecy should be exercised. However, in this balancing 
process it should be the information's value to the public rather 
than the particular personal interests of the requesting party that 
should be weighed against any countervailing  consideration^.^^^ 
Therefore, when the adverse impact of disclosure upon an estab- 
- 
97. FOZA Assessment, supra note 1, a t  920. 
98. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra. 
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). 
100. This is the general category of information treated by subsections (a)( l )  and (2) 
of the FOIA. It is also the clearest and most longstanding target of Congress' attempts to 
open up governmental processes to public view. See S. REP. NO. 813'89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965). 
101. S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8-9 (1965). 
102. One of the FOIA's principal accomplishments was to drop the "directly and 
properly concerned" test contained in its predecessor statute and to allow "any person" 
to receive agency information not otherwise exempted. The result of that change was to 
foreclose any judicial inquiry into the motives or interests of any particular requesting 
party. See id. at 5-6. 
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lished governmental program would be great, and when the infor- 
mational value of the record to the public is comparatively slight, 
a court might refuse to require disclosure of the information. 
At this point one might legitimately ask if the equitable dis- 
cretion doctrine avoids the difficulties presented by the policy 
approach.lo3 Although both methods share the advantage of giv- 
ing a court flexibility in making decisions, equitable discretion is 
preferable because it does not purport to deal with the threshold 
record requirement. Since the court is not forced to resort to an 
artificial definition of "record" in order to arrive a t  a just re- 
sult-a definition that might confuse analysis in other cases-it 
can deal with the issue in a straightforward, forthright manner. 
Concededly, because courts only have a limited role in the 
FOIA's administration, any exercise of discretion may border on 
judicial legislation. That problem is inherent in any attempt to 
achieve a degree of flexibility. Rather than force courts into an 
inflexible approach to the Act, however, this limited role should 
serve to suggest a final limitation on the use of equitable discre- 
tion: a healthy judicial respect for the purpose behind the FOIA 
and an honest recognition that discretion must truly be limited 
to the exceptional case. 
C.  The Model i n  Practice 
In order to visualize this model in action, let us return briefly 
to the sample cases. In the Nichols case, the Tenth Circuit's 
disposition of the record question on the statutory exemption 
ground was appropriate under this model. Assuming, however, 
that  an alternative ground did not exist, the district court 
reached the right conclusion, albeit by a somewhat less analytical 
route than the model would require. Instead of analyzing the 
characteristics of the items in question and comparing them with 
the characteristics which make items records, the court simply 
reviewed several definitions and concluded that clothing, histo- 
logical preparations, and the other objects in question are not 
records. Under the model the court should have compared the 
informational characteristics of the items with the dictionary, 
statutory, and common meaning rule aids in making its determi- 
nation. I t  would have shunned the formulation of a definition 
applicable to all cases, but would have concluded that, whatever 
the definition might ultimately be, these articles were not in- 
cluded within it. 
103. See notes 65-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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The facts in SDC Development illustrate the other half of the 
model. After a court determined that computer tapes squared 
with the common conception of the term "record," it would pro- 
ceed to equitable discretion analysis. First, it is clear that the 
records do not contain any of the types of information specifically 
considered by Congress; they do not deal with the structure, oper- 
ation, or decisionmaking processes of the agency, nor are they 
covered by a statutory exemption.lo4 Equitable discretion, there- 
fore, might be appropriate. The court would then examine the 
equities of the case. Disclosure of the MEDLARS tapes under the 
FOIA would be significantly detrimental to the National Library 
of Medicine.lo5 The library would lose its ability to recoup its 
developmental costs and gain valuable assistance from other in- 
stitutions and universities. The increased public benefit would be 
slight, since the tapes are already available to the public through 
libraries and other institutions. Making them available through 
the FOIA serves only to reduce the cost. Because the records were 
not a type specifically considered by Congress when enacting the 
FOIA, and since the equities favor nondisclosure, the court could 
exercise its discretion to refuse to compel disclosure, preserving 
the integrity of the National Library of Medicine while not signif- 
icantly affecting the public's interests under the Act. 
By limiting FOIA disclosure to information stored in agency 
records, Congress impliedly placed a qualitative threshold re- 
quirement on information disclosure. Courts can treat the record 
requirement in terms of policies internal and external to the FOIA 
or in terms of the traditional notions attached to the term 
"record." The policy approach, while having the advantage of 
adding flexibility to FOIA administration, is not a true threshold. 
Rather, it is a means of exempting from disclosure those catego- 
ries of records that the court does not believe to be the type which 
Congress intended that the FOIA reach. 
Serious difficulties, both legal and theoretical, attend an 
analysis based upon policy considerations. Apart from the lack of 
indication in the history and structure of the Act that such a 
result was contemplated, a policy analysis tends to put the court 
104. Because of the narrow construction given to the statutory exemptions, Depart- 
ment of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976), the library's claim that the charge 
provisions of the National Library of Medicine Act constitute a specific exemption of 
the tapes from FOIA disclosure could not withstand scrutiny. 
105. 542 F.2d at 1120. 
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into the position of a legislature. By dealing with the record re- 
quirement in terms of policy, the court adds an artificial require- 
ment to the Act, with a resultant confusion as to what the record 
requirement actually is. 
The more proper threshold exists in a commonsense ap- 
proach to the record requirement. By treating the term "record" 
in the commonly understood manner in which it is used, the 
threshold attains a level of certainty that is not possible under the 
policy approach. 
Nevertheless, mere mechanical application of an act as 
vague as the FOIA is not justified in light of the seriousness of 
the interests competing for the court's favor, nor by the history 
or purpose of the Act. Some flexibility must be maintained. It is 
in the doctrine of a limited and controlled equitable discretion, 
not in an artificial definition of "record," that such flexibility 
should be found. 
Stephen D. Hall 
